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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Volume XXVI Iay, 1938 Number 4
KENTUCKY DECISIONS ON FUTURE INTERESTS,
1933-1937
By W. LEwIs ROBEIRTS*
The problems in that part of property law usually desig-
nated as Future Interests are as varied as they are interesting.
The earlier holdings of the Kentucky Court of Appeals have
from time to time been considered in earlier numbers of this
journal.' It is the purpose of this paper to bring those sum-
maries down to date by reviewing the decisions that have been
rendered by the court during the past five years. The cases com-
ing under this caption are usually considered under the follow-
ing heading: Remainders, Possibility of Reverter, Executory
Limitations, Future Interests in Personal Property, Construction
of Limitations, Powers, The Rule Against Perpetuities, and
Restraints on Alienation. It is proposed to consider the recent
cases under these heads.
I. IrhA.I N s
The court is constantly being called upon to determine
whether a gift in a testator's will is an absolute one or whether
it is for the life of the first taker with a remainder over. Thus a
testator devises and bequeaths all the remainder of his estate to
his wife "both real and personal to be hers absolutely until her
death and the remainder then to go" to certain designated per-
sons. The court here found that the testator intended the wife
to take only a life estate but was entitled to receive from the
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. A. B.,
1903, Brown; A. M., 1915, Pennsylvania State College; J. D., 1920, Uni-
versity of Chicago; S. J. D., 1930, Harvard. Author of various articles
in legal periodicals, and of Roberts' Cases on Personal Property
(1938).
L (1923-24) 12 Ky. L. 3. 58, 115, 210; (1924-25) 13 Ky. L. J. 32,
83, 186; (1933) 21 Ky. L. J. 219; Kentucky Statute Against Perpetui-
ties (1928) 16 Ky. L. J. 97. Also notes, (1927) 15 Ky. L. J. 345; (1932)
20 Ky. L. J. 160.
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income and corpus of the estate a sufficient sum for comfortable
maintenance. What was left went as a remainder to the tes-
tator's children. 2 A devise of "all of my real estate to do with
as she sees fit" was held to give the wife a fee simple, as the
court was unwilling to cut down a gift by a void or repugnant
gift over. The will made a gift to the brothers and sisters of the
testator at the death of the wife "if she has any of my real estate
or personal property at that time.'' 3 A devise, however, of
property to testator's widow during her life or as long as she
remained a widow, with "remainder" to testator's blood heirs
at her death, gave the widow a life estate only. The court below
had held that she had a life estate with a power to dispose of the
property as she deemed necessary for her support, with a remain-
der of such as was left at her death or on her remarriage to go
to the testator's blood kin.4 The upper court ruled that the wife
here had no right of encroachment or consumption of the corpus
of the estate. In Thomas v. Combs a conveyance was made to
one and "his heirs and assigns" to have and to hold unto him
"during his time of life and at his death to be equally divided
between his heirs." This was held to convey only a life estate
to the grantee. And in Waggener v. PennO a father devised
lands to his daughter "during her natural life and at her death
to descend immediately to her heirs." If the rule in Shelley's
Case were still law in this state, this would give the daughter a
fee simple. The will provided that the daughter was not to sell
her interest. The court construed the words "her heirs" here to
mean "children." She was childless and the sole heir of her
father's estate and the court said she took the remainder while
she was alive, but subject to a defeasance, if she left children
when she died, "which under the decision in the old case passed
the fee save on the contingency that she died leaving children.
That contingency never happened, therefore her conveyance
passed a fee and there is nothing left for appellants to take."
This would be true were the rule in Shelley's Case law in this
jurisdiction. Otherwise it seems hard to support the decision.
The facts are practically the same as those in Bourbon Agricul-
Blessing v. Johnston, 249 Ky. 777, 61 S. W. (2d) 635 (1933).
Sumner v. Bordens, 266 Ky. 401, 98 S. W. (2d) 918 (1936).
'Taylor v. Taylor, 266 Ky. 375, 99 S. W. (2d) 201 (1936).
5259 Ky. 93, 82 S. W. (2d) 188 (1935).
0257 Ky. 124, 7T S. W. (2d) 427 (1934).
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tural Bank & Trust Company v. Miller7 where there was also
the gift of a life estate in a trust estate with a contingent remain-
der in the children of the life tenant, who was childless. There
was a reversion in the testator which passed to his heir, who
was the life tenant in this case also. Because the life tenant has
also the reversionary interest it does not follow that she can pass
a good fee. This would have been possible before the adoption
of the statute making contingent remainders indestructible.8 It
was the law that where there was a life estate followed by a con-
tingent remainder and the life tenant purported to convey a
larger estate than he had, his life estate was forfeited and the
contingent remainder was destroyed since it was not ready to
vest immediately upon the forfeiture of the life estate. In that
way the grantee of the life tenant would gain a fee. There is
also another statutory provision that should be considered in this
connection and that is the section which provides that if a person
purports to grant a greater estate than he has the deed shall
operate to convey on warrant so much of the right and estate
as such person can lawfully convey.0 Inferentially he cannot
convey a greater estate. There is also another section which pro-
vides that "the alienation of the particular estate on which a re-
mainder depends, or the union of such estate with the inheritance
by purchase or descent, shall not operate by merger or otherwise
to defeat, impair or affect such remainder."1 0 Of course it might
be argued that the statute preventing the destruction of contin-
gent remainders in effect turned contingent remainders into ex-
ecutory limitations which become effective upon the happening of
the specified contingency and therefore the grantee in the case
under consideration held a fee subject to such a limitation. Still
there remain the other statutory provisions.
Wood v. Cook" presented a case where the life tenant pur-
ported to convey a fee and it was held that only a life estate was
transferred by the deed. It did not affect the remainderman's
interest. The case of Barnes v. Johns'2 illustrates the well estab-
lished rule of construction that courts will construe a limitation
7205 Ky. 297, 265 S. W. 790 (1924).
8 Ky. Stat. (Carroll, 1936), § 2346.
'iM., § 2351.
'0Id., § 2347.
1248 Ky. 216, 58 S. W. (2d) 404 (1933).
"261 Ky. 181, 87 S. W (2d) 387 (1935).
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as creating a vested remainder rather than a contingent one.
There a devise of realty was made to a daughter for life with
remainder to her children. She died never having had children.
The language of the court seems to imply that the unborn chil-
dren took vested remainders. It says: "Where a testator, by his
will, when construed as a whole, gives to a devisee an estate for
life, and at the latter's death to any children that he or she
might have, and makes no further disposition of his property, the
unborn children take a defeasible fee, subject to its being de-
feated if there are no children born to the devisee, . . ." The
usual rule is that in such a case the unborn children would take
a contingent remainder.'3 It is true, as shown in Zinsmeister's
Trustee v. Long,14 that the possibility of defeasance does not
transform into a contingent remainder what would otherwise be
a vested remainder. In that case there was a trust provision that
"if any of said grandchildren should die before reaching the age
of thirty (30) years and leave issue surviving, such issue shall be
paid the share of their parent in said net income....." The
court held the interest vested subject to defeasance in event of
death under thirty years. In Vittitow v. Keene'5 a remainder
was given to three children equally during their lives, the share
of any who should die without issue to go to survivor or sur-
vivors. No provision was expressly made for the issue taldrig on
the death of the life tenants and the court found by implication
that such a remainder was created by a fair construction of the
whole will. It said that the unborn children of the life tenants
would be contingent remaindermen. There was a further pro-
vision to the effect that if all of testator's children should die
without issue the property should go over to testator's cousins.
In one case both realty and personalty were devised to the
testator's wife for her natural life, support and maintenance,
with power to sell. The court decided that she had a life estate
with a power to sell but that upon her decease, one having a
claim for her support and maintenance would not have a lien on
the property for the same. The lower court had ordered a sale
of the property to pay a hospital bill.16 Another suit involving
remainders concerned a marginal release on the page on which
13 Simes, Future Interests (1936), § 82.14250 Ky. 50, 61 S. W. (2d) 887 (1933).
265 Ky. 66, 95 S. W. (2d) 1083 (1936).
16 Whalin v. Whalin's Admr., 266 Ky. 209, 98 S. W. (2d) 501 (1936).
FUTURE INTERESTS
the deed was recorded. The life tenant sought to transfer his
life estate to the remainderman in that way so that the latter
could place a mortgage on the property. The court very properly
held the release ineffectual as a transfer of the interest and also
said that under the pleadings it could not be specifically enforced
as a contract to convey.17
Several actions by remaindermen for injuries to their inter-
ests have been considered by the Court of Appeals during the
past five years. It has held that remaindermen may recover
damages in proportion to their interest against a natural gas com-
pany which constructed pipe lines across the land as the injury
was presumed to be permanent.' s Vested remaindermen were
also allowed to join with the life tenant in recovering damages
against a mining company for wrongfully removing the sub-
jacent support to the land, and the contingent remaindermen
were also allowed to join in the action for the permanent injury
to the property. The principle of living contingent remainder-
men representing unborn contingent remaindermen applied. 19
The purchaser of barn timber from a life tenant was held answer-
able to the remainderman in Hayden v. Boetler,20 and in Head
v. Oldham Bank & Trust Co.21 the remaindermen were allowed
to recover interest on the principal fund from the death of the
life tenant and were allowed to enforce the mortgage lien on the
land including the amount of such interest. However, the re-
mainderman is not entitled to maintain an action of ejeetment
during the outstanding life estate.22  And a claim of adverse
possession does not run against the remaindermen in favor of a
life tenant "without some clear, positive, overt act or express
notice". 23
At least two cases concerning the transferability of contin-
gent remainders have arisen recently and the validity of such
transfer sustained under Section 2341 of the Statutes, since they
17 Miller v. Prater, 267 Ky. 11, 100 S. W. (2d) 842 (1937).
'4Warfield Nat. Gas Co. v. Ward, 254 Ky. 754, 72 S. W. (2d) 464
(1934).
' Cox v. Corrigan-McKinney Steel Co., 248 Ky. 426, 58 S. W. (2d)
G25 (1933).
*263 Ky. 722, 93 S. W. (2d) 831 (1936).
21249 Ky. 292, 60 S. W. (2d) 621 (1933).
" Parkey v. Arthur, 245 Ky. 525, 53 S. W. (2d) 921 (1932).
2Trimble v. Gordon, 270 Ky. 476, 109 S. W. (2d) 1217 (1937).
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are interests in land within the meaning of the statute.2 4 Also the
rule has been enforced that remainders are accelerated where a
widow having a life interest renounces that interest. The court
said that such remainders came into effect immediately as if
the widow had died.25 The property provided for the widow in
the will and which she renounces is taken to compensate those
legatees who are disappointed by her taking her dower and
statutory interest.26 This is in line with the law as followed
in other jurisdictions. 27
The question of the right to stock dividends and extraordi-
nary cash dividends has been recently before the cuurt and it
adhered to its well established rule that both go to the life
tenant and not in part to the remaindermen, and this is so even
though a portion of such surplus was earned before the testator
died.28 The court discussed the so-called Massachusetts and
Pennsylvania rules for the division of stock and extraordinary
dividends paid out of surplus accumulations. The former rule
gives cash dividends, whether ordinary or extraordinary, to the
life tenant and all stock dividends are regarded as capital and
added to the corpus of the estate. The latter rule regards all
dividends earned before the creation of the trust as belonging to
the remaindermen and all dividends, whether cash or stock,
earned during the continuance of the trust as income and belong-
ing to the life tenant.29
One more case dealing with remainders remains to be con-
sidered, Toddj;s Executors v. Todd.8 0  The court there refused
to uphold a provision in a will to the effect that the property
devised should not be subject to the debts of the devisee. It did,
however, uphold a provision that if creditors should undertake
to subject the trust fund to payment of the cestui's debts, the
trust should come to an end and the principal go to the remain-
dermen at once. In this case it was in the trustees' discretion
whether they should pay the income or not to the cestui so there
14Cox v. Corrigan-McKinney Steel Co., supra note 19, and Hurst v.
Russell, 257 Ky. 78, 77 S. W. (2d) 355 (1934).
-Ruh's Exrs. v. Ruh, 270 Ky. 792, 110 S. W. (2d) 1097 (1937),
Breckinridge v. Breckinridge's Exr., 264 Ky. 82, 94 S. W. (2d) 283
(1936), and Watson v. Trimble, 261 Ky. 253, 87 S. W. (2d) 359 (1935).
2 Ruh's Executors v. Ruh, supra note 25.
2Simes, Future Interests (1936), § 761.
'Hubley's Gdn. v. Wolfe, 259 Ky. 574, 82 S. W. (2d) 830 (1935)
ID., at 582.
30260 Ky. 611, 86 S. W. (2d) 168 (1935).
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was nothing that could be subjected to the payment of the
cestui's debts until the trustees had exercised their discretion
and allotted funds to him.
II. PossIrrTY OF REVERTER
Only two or three cases involving possibilities of reverter
have been disposed of during the past five years. In Sargent v.
Trustees of Christian. Church of Little CyprasS,31 property was
deeded to a church and to a Masonic lodge with the provision
that when either grantee ceased as an order or as a Christian
Church its share of the property should revert to the grantor. It
was held that the land did not revert to the grantor upon the
services being discontinued temporarily because of financial
difficulties and sickness among the congregation and immaterial
changes in the church's affiliations. In another case the grantor
inserted a clause in his deed whereby the land should revert to
the grantor's legal heirs after the grantor's death if the grantees
did not sell the property during their lifetime. This was not a
determinable fee that was created and the court properly treated
it as a life estate in the grantees with a remainder to-the heirs of
the grantor.32 This was the creation of a life estate with a power
to sell and a remainder over on failure to sell. Such remainders
are good.33 In Fayette County Board of Education v. Bryan34
land was conveyed to a school district trustees to be held so long
as it should be used for school purposes. This created a deter-
minable fee subject to a possibility of reverter in the grantor on
the cessation of the use of the land for the purpose specified. The
fact that other land in the neighborhood was used for school
purposes did not prevent the land from reverting to the grantor.
III. PERSONAL PROPERTY
While the tendency seems to be in dealing with future gifts
in personal property to make use of the device of a trust, we
find that the courts are frequently called upon to solve prob-
lems where testators have failed to draw any line between the
disposition of personalty and that of realty in creating future
'252 Ky. 57, 66 S. W. (2d) 5 (1933).
12 Mllls v. Mills, 261 Ky. 190, 87 S. W. (2d) 389 (1935).
33 Kales' Estates in Future Interests (2d ed.), § 725. But see Davis'
Admr. v. Bottoms, 258 Ky. 228, 79 S. W. (2d) 963 (1935).
34263 Ky. 61, 91 S. W. (2d) 990 (1936).
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interests in the same. The courts no longer ask whether you can
have future estates in personal property.30 They now take it
for granted that you can. Nor do they try to explain the basis
of such interests. The Court of Appeals has said that a remain-
derman in such a case takes personalty from the testator through
his executor and after the life tenant, and does not take from or
through the life tenant.3 6 A testator left his business and per-
sonal property to his wife for life with the power "to sell, con-
vey, or conduct the business" and further provided that "what
may be remaining in her hands" at her death should be equally
divided among his brothers and sisters and their portions to go
to their children at their death. It was there held that his wife
had a life estate and the brothers and sisters together with their
children took a remainder. In treating the property as her own
the widow was carrying out the testator's intent. In Caperton
v. Smith's Trustee37 the income of a trust fund was given to tes-
tator's nephews and nieces by name, with remainder to the
widow or children of any that should die leaving a widow or
children and, on the death of the last nephew or niece, the prop-
erty was to be "equally divided among the then surviving chil-
dren" of nieces and nephews. This was held to create a con-
tingent remainder in the testator's grandnephews and grand-
nieces living at the death of the last nephew or niece.38
IV. CONsTRucTION OF LImITATIONS
The Court of Appeals is constantly being called upon to
determine what grantor in a deed or a testator in his will means
by such expressions as "children," "issue of their body,"
"bodily heirs," "heirs of the body," "die without children,"
"die without issue," "without leaving issue," or "dying with-
out heirs."
(a) "CHLDREN"
While the court will not ordinarily construe the word "chil-
dren" to include "grandchildren" there may be cases where it
is evident from the instrument under consideration as a whole
'5Trapp v. Baskin, 246 Ky. 438, 55 S. W. (2d) 29 (1933).
'
0 Hall's Admr. v. Hall's Exr., 265 Ky. 528, 97 S. W. (2d) 23 (1936).
268 Ky. 223, 104 S. W. (2d) 440 (1937).
,Anspacher v. Utterback's Admr., 252 Ky. 666, 68 S. W. (2d) 151
(1934).
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that the testator or grantor so intended the word to be used. For
instance where an estate was devised to a wife for life with re-
mainder over to three daughters, if any "die without leaving
children, the issue of their body, to survive them, then over to
the other children." It was held that "children" included the
grandchildren of the testator, although "issue of their body"
would indicate a contrary result. The court said that the testator
did not intend to disinherit the grandhildren.3 9 Also where a
will gave realty to a daughter for life with remainder to any
child or children the daughter might have living at her death,
this was held to include grandchildren, hence the interest vested
in the child of a deceased son of the daughter upon the daugh-
ter's death. 40 The court was unwilling to resort to a construction
of the will that would evidently defeat the intent of the testator.
It also relied upon Kentucky Statutes, section 2064, which is to
the effect that a devise to children embraces grandchildren when
there are no children and no other construction will give effect
to the devise. In another will the testator made a gift to the
children and grandchildren of certain persons, adding "to the
following named persons." He then named all such children
and grandchildren except four. It was contended that the gift
was to a class and the four names had been omitted by mistake.
The court, however, held that these four did not take anything
under the gift.41
(b) "BODILY HEmIR", "HEIRS Op THE BODY"
Such expressions as "heirs of the body" or "bodily heirs"
under the old law created a fee tail which gave the first taker
really a life estate with the inheritance passing on his death to
the heirs of his body. This was changed in our law by statute42
and as soon as such an estate is created by deed or will the statute
immediately converts it into a fee simple in the first taker. In
some states in this country the statute converts such a devise into
an estate for life in the first taker and a fee in his heirs. 43 In
Kinnard v. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank44 the Court of Appeals
correctly held that the words "bodily heirs" created a fee tail
' Hodge v. Lovell's Trustee, 262 Ky. 509, 90 S. W. (2d) 683 (19365).
40 Tucker v. Tucker, 259 Ky. 361, 82 S. W. (2d) 458 (1935).4 1Leroy v. Read's Executor, 252 Ky. 821, 68 S. W. (2d) 421 (1934).
41 Ky. Stat. (Carroll, 1936), § 2343.
43 Slmes, Future Interests (1936), § 190.
-249 Ky. 661, 61 S. W. (2d) 291 (1933).
K. L. J.-2
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which the statute immediately converted into a fee simple and
did not create a joint estate in the testator's son and the latter's
children, hence the children took no interest in the land. "Bodily
heirs," the court said, were not words of purchase but of limita-
tion here. While conceding that such words might be used inter-
changeably with the word "children" they would be given their
technical meaning, unless it appears from the instrument they
are used in a contrary sense. In this particular case, also, they
held the words to be words of limitation and not of purchase.45
In Simons v. Bowers46 the devise was to testator's daughter
"and their bodily heirs." It was contended that the phrase
"bodily heirs" meant children and that they took by purchase
and not by descent. While they conceded that in many cases evi-
dence of such intent on the part of the testator has been allowed,
the court regarded the question in this case as evenly balanced
and they resolved it in favor of the daughters' taking a fee.
Finally, in WThittaker v. Fitzpatrick,47 after providing that the
land should go to the testator's son "and heirs of his body" the
testator added that it was his purpose to secure to each of his liv-
ing children a home for themselves and their families free from
debt, " and which will at the death of each pass free and unencum-
bered to their children." The court said the words were not to
be given their technical meaning here. The devise to the son was
a life estate only and his children were vested with, a remainder.
"Heirs of his body" here were words of purchase and "chil-
dren" included "grandchildren.'
(c) "DYING WITHOUT IssuE", "Din WITHOUT CHILDREN"
It is very common to find in wills, executory limitations
over after such expressions as "dying without issue", "dying
without children" or "dying without heirs." The court will
apply, if possible, section 2344 of the Statutes and make the
dying without issue mean dying within the life time of the tes-
tator or the life time of the life tenant and in that way give an
indefeasible fee to the devisee. It did this in Pegram v. Kauf-
man.48 There the estate was to go over to the niece after the
Campbell v. Prestonsburg Coal Co., 258 Ky. 77, 79 S. W. (2d) 373
(1934).
4258 Ky. 755, 81 S. W. (2d) 604 (1935).
4'268 Ky. 120, 103 S. W. (2d) 670 (1937).
-261 Ky. 50, 86 S. W. (2d) 1042 (1935).
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death of the testator's wife with the provision that if she should
die without issue, the property should go to the testator's heirs.
The title of the niece became absolute upon her outliving the tes-
tator's widow. In Servier v. Servier's Administrator49 there
was a proviso that if the beneficiary died before the contemplated
division of the property, his issue should take his share but his
share should go to the surviving beneficiaries in the absence of
issue. It was held that the heirs of a deceased beneficiary who
died without issue subsequent to the time for such division should
take such beneficiary's share not received by her in her lifetime.
In Wilson v. Trabzee50 a gift was made to children but if any
should die without children his or her share should go to the
surviving children. All but one had died intestate and without
issue and it was held that the survivor had a fee simple. In
another case a farm was devised to a nephew "but should he die
before he arrives at the age of 21 years or die without a child
of his own, said land is to revert to my estate." The nephew
was allowed to take a defeasible fee rather than a fee simple
title subject to the occurrence of either of the two contingencies
named.5 1  Where the death of the contingent remainderman
occurred prior to the happening of the contingency and pre-
vented the trust from being carried out, the heir at law having
died prior to the contingency but subsequent to the death of the
remainderman, the estate of the heir was allowed to share in
the division of the trust fund.5 2 In Smith v. WebbOA the remain-
derman's interest was to go over to a third person if he "die
without children or issue" and the court held this clause was to
be restricted to the remainderman's death before the termination
of the life estate, and in Ryan v. Bail5 "dying without heirs"
was held to refer to death at any time and the interest was lost
by death in the lifetime of the testatrix. Finally in Renaker v.
Tanner"5 to die without issue with no express disposition in the
case of such event, gave a remainder by implication to the
tenant's issue if he left any. The court reaffirmed in this case
4261 Ky. 35, 86 S. W. (2d) 1033 (1935).
0254 Ky. 661, 72 S. W. (2d) 57 (1934).
6'Young v. Madison's Exr., 252 Ky. 99, 66 S. W. (2d) 1 (1933).
"Arnold v. Clay, 262 Ky. 336, 90 S. W. (2d) 55 (1936).
53263 Ky. 26, 91 S. W. (2d) 987 (1936).
11267 Ky. 83, 101 S. W. (2d) 187 (1937).
260 Ky. 281, 83 S. W. (2d) 54 (1935).
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the old doctrine that a woman is presumed to be capable of bear-
ing children so long as life lasts.
V. PowEsS
Cases involving the construction and application of powers
have quite frequently demanded the attention of the Court of
Appeals. In fact one instrument containing a grant of a power
in it has been before this court five or six times. In one of the
earlier of these five or six decisions concerning the same will, St.
Matthews Bank v. De Charette,56 the court defined a general
power as one that authorized the donee of the power to dispose
of the estate or interest in the property to whomsoever he pleases,
including himself. If, however, it is limited to a specific pur-
pose or to persons in a particular class, the court said, it is a
special power. In this case there was a devise of a farm to the
testatrix's daughter for life in trust with power to dispose of
it by will. This created a general testamentary power. An
estate in remainder was intended to be effective only in case the
daughter failed to exercise the power. The creditors of the
donee of the power sought to reach the interest affected by the
power as assets of the estate of the donee under the doctrine of
equitable assets, which is followed by a majority of jurisdictions
in this country.5 7 Courts that follow this view hold that since the
donee of the power can make an appointment for his own benefit,
and he exercises the power, he should do so for the benefit of
creditors. The beneficiaries, otherwise, are mere volunteers and
should not stand in the way of creditors reaching the property,
so equity views it. The Court of Appeals rejects the view of the
majority of courts and says that the donee's exercise of the
power does not justify the court in seizing the property for the
payment of the donee's debts where her estate is insufficient to
pay them. In Godfrey v. De Charette58 the court held the ap-
pointment under the power was valid, and in De Charette v. De
Charette59 it said that if the power of appointment is not exer-
cised in good faith and for the purpose created and in the man-
ner provided, the power would be deemed ineffectual against
-259 Ky. 802, 83 S. W. (2d) 471, 99 A. L. R. 1146 (1935). See
Note (1937) 25 Ky. L. J. 285.
Simes, Future Interests (1936). § 265.
260 Ky. 147, 84 S. W. (2d) 66 (1935).
'264 Ky. 525, 94 S. W. (2d) 1018, 104 A. L. R. 1455 (1936).
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parties entitled to its benefits. It further rules the power can-
not be delegated or assigned. The question of the Rule against
Perpetuities was also involved in the case.
Where property was devised to one to have and to hold dur-
ing the grantee's life with power to sell, the grantee acquired
only a life estate so that his creditors could take only the life
estate.0 0 A devise of a fee was restricted by subsequent words
in the will and reduced to a life estate. It purported to "au-
thorize and power him (the executor) to sell and dispose of any
and all of my estate as he may see fit for the benefit and comfort
of my said wife." This gave the executor a power to sell the
property.0 1 In another case the executor was empowered to
make leases for the development of coal and oil rights during a
five-year period.0 2 In still another case a wife was given a
life interest with power to sell, lease or dispose of both the realty
and personalty and what was left was to be divided between two
nephews of the testator. This gave her a power and not a fee
in the property, in addition to her life estate.6 3 An opposite
result was reached where the will gave a life estate and the right
to sell, convey, dispose of the use and to do with it as she pleased,
except that she could not sell to certain persons.64
VI. RuiE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
Any conveyance of property which does not vest within
lives in being, twenty-one years and ten months is void under the
Rule against Perpetuities. The statute puts the rule in a dif-
ferent form. It provides that the absolute power of alienation
shall not be suspended for a longer period than a life or lives in
being at the time of the creation of the estate, and twenty-one
years and ten months.65 The rule does not apply to a right of
reverter 66 The Court of Appeals has held that it does not apply
to options given for the repurchase of land. 6 It said that the
transaction was capable of being exercised at any time the parties
6Roby v. Arterburn, 269 Ky. 816, 108 S. W. (2d) 873 (1937).
Lewis v. Lewis, 253 Ky. 843, 70 S. W. (2d) 679 (1934).
Auxier's Executrix v. Theobald, 255 Ky. 583, 75 S. W. (2d) 464
(1934).
Slayden v. Hardin, 257 Ky. 685, 79 S. W. (2d) 11 (1935).
61 Davis' Administrator v. Bottoms, 258 Ky. 228, 79 S. W. (2d) 963
(1935).
6Ky. Stat. (Carroll, 1936), § 2360.
m Fayette County Board of Education v. Bryan, supra, note 34.
OColey v. Hard, 250 Ky. 250, 62 S. W. (2d) 792 (1933).
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desired so that the option did not constitute a limitation or con-
dition forbidding the selling and conveyancing the land for a
longer period than that allowed. American courts as a rule take
an opposite view and hold that options are within the rule except
in the ease of leases.68
In Emler v. Emler's Trustee6" the testator gave his property
in trust for the benefit of his wife for life and then the income
was to go to his three children. After their death it was to be
divided among the testator's grandchildren "that are here
now or may hereafter be born to either one of my sons or daugh-
ter. Should any one of my sons have no children, it is to go back
to his legal heirs, after his death." Whether the provision came
within the rule or not depended on whether "it" referred to
the corpus of the estate or the income. The court said the will
being susceptible of two constructions, one of which create a per-
petuity in violation of the rule and the other construction would
make a valid disposition, it would adopt the latter construction.
This seems to be in keeping with a great many recent decisions70
but not with the view long held by the courts in this country and
not with the earlier Kentucky decisions as pointed out by the
counsel for the appellant, namely, that the meaning of the will
is first to be determined without regard to the rule and then the
rule applied.
Where the interest is to vest at the death of the life tenant,
there is no violation of the rule.71 Whether a power comes
within the rule or not will be determined by reference to the
death of the creator of the power. The instrument exercising
the power, the court said in De Mlarette v. Do Charette, relates
back as if it were a part of the instrument by which the power
was created.7 2 Then there is the question that came up in the
earlier case of Brown. v. Columbia Finance & Trust Co.7 One
having a power to appoint created by will, attempted to give her
appointees a power to appoint and not a fee as was intended by
the original donor of the power. The second attempted appoint-
ment was held void under the Rule against Perpetuities and the
Simes, Future Interests (1936), § 512.
269 Ky. 27, 106 S. W. (2d) 79 (1937).
Simes, Future Interests (1936), § 550.
Fischer v. Porter, 263 Ky. 372, 92 S. W. (2d) 368 (1936). But
see Renaker v. Tanner, supra, note 55.
2 Supra, note 59.
p123 Ky. 775, 97 S. W. 421 (1906).
FUTURE INTERESTS
children of the second appointor were allowed to take equally
under the will.7 4
VII. RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION
As has been pointed out in earlier articles published in this
journal,75 the Court of Appeals of this state has gone farther
than any other court in allowing restraints on alienation. It
will allow the grant of a fee with the usual incident of convey-
ing the same greatly restricted for a reasonable time. The court
itself will decide whether the restraint is reasonable or not.
Where land was devised and the testator expressed it as his will
and desire that it should not be conveyed or incumbered by mort-
gage by the devisee until he should arrive at the age of thirty
years, the court raised no objection to the provision7 6  The
clause was considered together with other provisions in the will
to determine what kind of an estate the devisee took. Since the
court has often held such restraints valid in its earlier decisions,77
the decision in this case is in line with the rule of stare deaiss.
A restriction on the alienation of realty for five years contained
in a devise was sustained in Auxier's Executrix v. Theobald,78
and a restraint on alienation to certain persons is not invalid.7 9
CONCLUSION
In the period of five years the Court of Appeals has passed
upon many cases calling for construction of wills and deeds.
This is not out of the ordinary. Troublesome questions are pre-
sented as to wvhether a testator intended the devisee to have a
fee or only a life estate. The decision in such a case usually
turns on the testator's intent as shown by the whole will. There
have been two decisions that would do justice to the Rule in
Shelley's Case were it law in this jurisdiction today, reeru-
descences, one might say. There are also some very questionable
statements about unborn children having vested remainders.
Perhaps one might say that the court has been over-emphatic in
applying the rule that a remainder will be construed as vested
"Barnes v. Graves, 259 Ky. 180, 82 S. W. (2d) 297 (1935).
Bupra, note 1.
" Young v. Madison's Executor, supra, note 51.
"See 13 Ky. L. J., 195; 21 ide. 235.
"Supra, note 62.
'Davis' Admr. v. Bottoms, supra, note 64.
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rather than as contingent. There are many cases where remain-
dermen, both vested and contingent, have been allowed to sue or
to participate in suits brought against trespassers for injuries to
property. This may be a phase of the law that is likely to develop
in the future to a considerable degree. The court has taken the
minority view that property passing under a general power of
appointment, if the power is exercised, cannot be taken by
creditors of the donee of the power to pay the donee's debts. It
has also taken a minority view that options are not within the
rule against perpetuities. Likewise it has departed from the well
established rule that a will or deed must first be construed as to
its meaning before the rule against perpetuities is applied to
determine whether a gift is valid.
